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SUPREME COURT comw OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of 
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Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI ## 0 1 -09-ST0096 Index No. 23 17-09 
Bennet Goodman, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
1428 Midland Avenue, Suite 6 
Bronxville, New York 10708-6042 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
A ttomey For R e y m ~ d e n t  
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Robert M. Blum, Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGh”IENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
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The petitioner, an inmate at Groveland Correctiond Facility, has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated March 
25,2008, which denied petitioner discretionary release on parole. The respondent opposes 
the petition seeking its dismissal. 
The petitioner is currently serving a term of 25-years to life following a guilty verdict 
on December 18, 1981 on the charge of Murder, Secoxl Degree. The circumstances 
underlying this conviction involved the petitioner, then 1 7-years-old, entering a neighbor’s 
house ostensibly to return a misdirected piece of mail. Within a few minutes of being in that 
house, the petitioner had stabbed the 36-year-old, female victim 21 times. 
On March 25,2008, the petitioner reappeared before the Parole Board for the second 
time. At that interview, the Parole Board discussed the instant offense with the petitioner, 
including a discussion with respect to the insights that the petitioner has gained over his 27- 
years of incarceration regarding what lead him to commit the murder. The Parole Board also 
took note of the petitioner’s disciplinary record and congratulated him on his fine efforts at 
programming and his educational endeavors. In addition, the Parole Bonrd d i m w e d  the 
petitioner’s post-release plans, which include living with his wife of 14-years and attempting 
to further his education in psychology. The Board also gave the petitioner an opportunity to 
discuss any matters he wanted to raise with the Parole Board. 
Following the interview, the Parole Board released its decision, which provided: 
After a review of the record and interview. the panel has 
determined that if released at this time, that your release would 
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be incompatible with the welfare of society. This decision is 
based on the following factors: Your instant offense murder 2’ld 
involved you fatally stabbing your victim. This offense 
represents your only felony conviction. You have maintained a 
satisfactory disciplinary record since January of 1998. This 
panel notes your positive programmatic participation. including 
coinpletion of Phase 111, ASAT and ART. You have also 
continued your productive work as a clerk in the library (Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice [dated3-3 1-08], Answer, Exhibit 
E). 
The Parole Board directed that he be held for 24 months. 
The petitioner then administratively appealed this determination. After the Appeals 
Unit did not determine that appeal, the petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 
proceeding. Among the arguments advanced by the petitioner, he maintains that the Parole 
Board (1) rendered a determination that was irrational bordering on impropriety; (2) failed 
to consider all the statutory factors, including factors favoring release and improperly relied 
solely on the instant offense; (3) rendered a predetermined decision; (4) illegally re-sentenced 
the petitioner; ( 5 )  placed on excessive hold on him; and (6) violated the separation of powers 
doctrine and the petitioner’s right to due process. 
First, the Court notes that, the sole consequence to the Appeals Unit failure to timely 
issue a decision is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her administrative remedy to be 
exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial review of the underlying 
determination (see 9 NYCRR 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York State DiviFi0.l of Parole, 269 
AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 
636 [3rd Dept 20001). Otherwise, as stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
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“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released. he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law. and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept 19931, citing _Matter of McKee v New York State Bd. of Parole, 
157 AD?d 944). T f  the parole board’s decision ic made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v 
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter ot Kusso v h e w  L ork State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence 
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of the above. there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v New York State of Division of Parole. 294 AD2d 
726 [3rd Dept 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. The record before the Court 
reveals that the Parole Board reviewed the sentencing minutes and the pre-sentence report 
as well as the Inmate Status Report. A review of the transcript of the parole interview reveals 
that, in addition to the instant offense. attention was paid to such factors as petitioner's 
institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. In addition, 
the Parole Board allowed the petitioner an opportunity to discuss any other matter he felt 
warranted the Parole Boards' attention (see Matter of Serna v New York State Div. of Parole, 
279 AD2d 684, 684-685 [3d Dept 20011). While the petitioner argues that the majority of 
the time he was before the Parole Board the discussion only concerned the underlying 
offense, that is a inis-characterization of the interview. As noted, during that interview the 
Parole Roxd  also disciic.4 with the petitioner any insiphts he gained while incarcerated that 
would lead to his ability to live a crime-free, productive life if released. Further, the parole 
decision (supra) was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial 
ofparole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (E Matter of Siao-Pao, 
11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept19941; Matter 
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of Green v New York State Division of Parole. 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept 19931). 
The Court rejects petitioner‘s argument that the Parole Board usurped the sentencing 
court’s authority by holding him for 24 months. “The scheduling of the reconsideration 
hearing was a matter for the Board to determine in the exercise of its discretion, subject to 
the statutory 24-month maximum” (NI.iuL*i I 1 ;  I ( i i  :,: i i r ’  I - 1  ‘~!;:i ’I I ’ I  I \ .  Div. of Parole, 290 
AD2d 907, 908 [3d Dept 20021). Thus, the Parole Board neither usurped the sentencing 
court‘s authority nor violated the separation of powers doctrine (see Matter of Marsh v New 
York State Div. ofparole, 3 1 AD3d 898,898 [3d Dept 20061; Matter of Abascal v New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 23 AD3d 740,741 [3d Dept 20051; Connelly v New York State Div. of 
Parole, 286 AD2d 792, 793 [3d Dept 20011, lv dismissed 97 NY2d 677). Likewise, the 
Court rejects petitioner’s argument that the additional hold of 24 months is excessive. 
Nothing in the record suggests that the Parole Board abused its discretion in holding 
petitioner for the maximum statutory period (see Matter of Marsh, 3 1 AD3d at 898; Matter 
of Abascal, 23 AD3d at 741). 
With rcgard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his riyht tn 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 7 3 ,  supra). It has been repeatedly held that 
Executive Law fj 259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate 
6 
[* 6]
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board’s exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 
169, 171 [2d Cir. 20011; &l3win v Goord, 255 F3d 40. 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v 
Hammock, 605 F2d 661,664 [2d Cir. 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,1367- 
1368 [SDNY 19811; h l , i i r c t  ( 1 1  K I i -  ( 3  i YLi%. \I & ! 1 1 < >  ~ I , I [ , ~  l h l  1 1 1  t’.\lIlfc,50NY2d69,75-76, 
supra, Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept 20051; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept 20071). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the 
inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter o f  Weir v New York SQje Diykin-f 
Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of 
Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863 [3rd Dept 1996]), 
as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd 
Dept 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept 19981). The Parole 
Board i; not required to enumerate or giT.2 equal weight to znch fnctnr th2t it cnmidered in 
determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Wise 
v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept 20081). Nor must the Parole 
Board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 
5 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept 20061). In 
other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place 
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particular emphasis on, the circumstances ofthe crimes for which a peti 
as well as a petitioner's criminal history, together with the other 
determining whether the individual 'will live and remain at liberty with 
ioner is incarcerated. 
statutory factors, in 
ut violating the law,' 
whether his or her 'release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,' and whether 
release will 'deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law"' 
(Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept 20041, quoting 
Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations omitted). 
Further, the fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not 
confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v 
Alexander, 54 AD3d 11 14, 11 15 [3rd Dept 20081). The Parole Board is vested with the 
discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the 
sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v 
Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd 
Dept 20061 Iv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd 
Dept 20071). Moreover, the record doe0 not support petitioner's asw-tion that the decision 
was predetermined consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of 
parole to all violent felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument 
(see Matter of Lue-Shing, v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept 20031; Matter of Perez v 
State of New York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept 20021; Matter of Jones v 
Travis, 293 AD2d 800, 801 [3rd Dept 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd 
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Dept 20051. Matter of Wood v Dennison. 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept 20061; Matter of Motti 
v Dennison, 38 AD3d 1030, 103 1 [3rd Dept 20071). The Court notes that parole is not a 
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined (see Matter of 
Lue-Shina v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827. 828 [3d Dept 20031, lv denied 99 NY2d 51 1, quoting 
Matter of Silmon, 95 NY2d at 476). Here, the record makes clear that the Parole Board was 
not only aware of the petitioner’s institutional and educational achievements but positively 
commented about them. Further, during the interview. the Parole Board essentially 
acknowledged that the weighing of factors in this instance was very difficult. 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. Inasmuch as petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden of showing the Parole Board’s 
determination exhibited irrationality bordering on impropriety, judicial interference is 
unwarranted (Matter of Cilmnt-., 95 NY2d at 476; Matter of Farid, 17 AD3d at 754). 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is hereby dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is being returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other 
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papers are being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/ judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
Ciitry oi' filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
Y' ENTER 
Dated: September a ,2009 
Troy, New York preme Court Justice 
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